It has long been observed that a country tends to receive increased foreign direct investment (FDI) inow when its currency depreciates. We provide an explanation of this correlation and examine the implied welfare eects of short-run FDI ow. Firms' crossborder production location decisions are analyzed in an open-economy macroeconomic model in which both the exchange rate and FDI ow are endogenously determined. The exchange rate and FDI ow are positively correlated under monetary or productivity shocks. Furthermore, we show that short-run FDI uctuations exacerbate utility loss over business cycles in an environment with nominal shocks, but has little impact on welfare over business cycles caused by productivity shocks. The rst best outcome occurs when the economy retains long-run FDI, but restricts short-run movements in the production location of rms.
Ideally, you'd have every plant you own on a barge to move with currencies and changes in the economy.
-Jack Welch
Introduction
From a macroeconomic perspective, foreign direct investment (FDI) is usually seen as a winwin strategy. It promotes economic growth for developing countries, and reduces production cost for developed countries. Economists have gone a long way in identifying and quantifying the various benets of FDI. Previous studies mainly focus on the long-run equilibrium gain of openness to FDI. This paper adds to the literature by examining the welfare implications of openness to FDI from a short-run perspective. Our model features two countries that are asymmetric in average productivities. FDI ow that occurs in the steady-state of the economy is termed long-run FDI, and changes in the FDI ow over the business cycle is termed short-run FDI. We nd that short-run FDI hurts world welfare under nominal shocks, but has little eect on welfare under productivity shocks. Overall, uctuations of FDI over the business cycle reduce welfare, and the rst best outcome is achieved when long-term FDI is retained while short-run movements in the production location of rms are prohibited.
In addition, our model is able to account for an important stylized fact about FDI ows over the business cycle. It has long been observed that the net FDI inow and exchange rate are positively correlated over the business cycle. Namely, a country tends to receive more FDI inow when its currency depreciates. This pattern has been neglected by most previous general equilibrium models with multinational production. Our model produces this positive correlation between FDI inow and exchange rate under both monetary and productivity shocks.
In recent years, the popular press has noted the return of manufacturing jobs to developed countries following the depreciation of domestic currencies.
1 This relationship between exchange rate and FDI ow has been well known to economics researchers. Since the mid1980s, a large volume of empirical studies has documented that a country's exchange rate and FDI inows are positively correlated. The abundance of empirical evidence has led Blonigen (2005) , in a survey paper about the empirical determinants of FDI, to list the 1 See, for example, Canon to return some production to Japan, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 2014, and Welcome home, The Economist, Jan. 19, 2013. level of exchange rate as one of the signicant determinants of short-run FDI ow.
2 Earlier theories explaining this correlation typically take a partial equilibrium approach in which the movement in exchange rate is treated as an independent and exogenous event. This paper provides an explanation to this correlation by incorporating multinational enterprises (MNEs) into an open economy macroeconomic model where both the level of FDI ow and exchange rate are endogenously determined. We then examine the welfare eects of FDI ow in this framework.
We study rms' production location decisions in a two-country model based on Devereux and Engel (2001) . Our paper focuses on vertical FDI ows, which means that rms move to produce in a foreign country to take advantage of lower production cost abroad, rather than to gain access to consumers of the local market. FDI is modeled as rms' prepaid, xed investment cost when they decide to move production overseas. Location decisions need to be made one period ahead of actual production. Firms in each country are heterogeneous in their productivity levels, and the two countries are asymmetric in terms of average productivity.
Households set wage in a Calvo manner, inducing sluggish adjustment of the real wage. The uncertainty in the model comes from both monetary shocks and productivity shocks.
A rm's relative protability of producing abroad depends positively on its productivity, and on the expected gap in real wages between domestic and foreign workers. A rm decides its production location by comparing the expected gain from switching to a low production cost location with the xed cost of the switch. Given a lower expected real wage abroad, there exists a cuto rm who will just break even in expectation by switching its production location. Every rm with a higher productivity than the cuto rm must earn a strictly positive prot abroad, and thus becomes a MNE in the following period.
We show that the countries' average productivities determine the long-run direction and volume of cross-border FDI ow. Specically, the country with higher average productivity becomes the source country of FDI, and the country with lower productivity becomes the recipient country. This is because without cross-border relocation of production, the country with lower productivity has lower real wage, making it protable for the more productive rms in the source country to relocate.
The model generates positive comovement between exchange rate and FDI under either monetary or productivity shocks. A domestic monetary expansion, for example, causes a depreciation of domestic real wage under sluggish wage adjustment. As the wage gap is expected to persist into the next period, when production takes place, more rms are enticed 2 This empirical fact is robust for developed countries and developing countries alike. A non-exhaustive list of empirical works conrming the positive relationship include Cushman (1985) ; Ray (1989) ; Froot and Stein (1991) ; Klein and Rosengren (1994) ; Grosse and Trevino (1996) ; Bayoumi and Lipworth (1998) ; Kiyota and Urata (2004) ; Buch and Kleinert (2008) .
to relocate to the depreciating country. On the other hand, a positive domestic productivity shock causes domestic real wage to increase relative to foreign wage. The lower expected relative real wage abroad, together with better production technology, increases a rm's expected gain from moving abroad. Thus more rms are prompted to produce in the foreign country.
The steady state of the model is Pareto optimal. Consequently, deviations from steadystate following a nominal shock represent ineciencies caused by nominal rigidity. In this process, rm relocation tends to further aggravate the harm. Consider a foreign depreciation.
The inux of foreign rms increases labor demand, but without FDI, foreign households are already working too much compared with the exible-wage long-run equilibrium level. Yet when cross-border relocation is allowed, the increased labor demand from the new MNEs causes foreign households to work even more. Likewise, domestic households will work even less. Thus when the economy is hit by monetary shocks, rm relocation pushes aggregate employments further away from ecient levels.
To assess how FDI aects welfare, we compute the expected world utility by numerically simulating the model under second order approximation. We compare expected world utility in the benchmark model with utilities in two alternative scenarios -when all rms produce domestically, and when only long-term relocations are allowed. Our key ndings are three-fold. First, rm relocations in the steady-state are welfare-improving. Second, with nominal shocks, short-run FDI uctuations further deteriorate welfare loss caused by nominal frictions through the aforementioned employment eects. With real shocks, short-run FDI uctuations have little welfare eect as a result of several counteracting forces. Finally, the rst best outcome can be achieved in a setting where long term rm relocation is retained, but short-run, temporary relocations are eliminated. In the benchmark simulation, world utility is highest at every volatility level of real and nominal shocks when the distribution of MNEs is kept constant at the steady-state level, but moving further back-and-forth is prohibited in the short run. This paper contributes to the literature on gains from openness to FDI. Previous works primarily focus on long-run gains from productivity improvement. For instance, McGrattan and Prescott (2009) examine host country's gains from FDI in a growth model in which a country can exploit another country's technological capital by opening to FDI. In the Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) model, foreign management know-how is incorporated as an additional factor of production into a neoclassical model. The authors estimate that the host country has large output and welfare gains from opening to FDI. Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) and Ramondo (2014) employ models based on new trade theory to measure gains from FDI. Ramondo (2014) focuses on horizontal FDI, in which aliates of MNEs sell output only in the host country. Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) , on the other hand, incorporates various types of FDI into a trade model, and uses the model to examine how trade interacts with FDI. These papers all look at long-run gains from openness to FDI derived from increased productivity or availability of goods. Our work contributes to the literature by providing a welfare analysis from a short-run perspective.
Early theories explaining the positive relationship between FDI inow and exchange rate include, but are not limited to, Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997) . Most early theories take a partial equilibrium approach in which exchange rate is assumed to be exogenous. A notable exception is Russ (2007) , in which both the exchange rate and FDI are endogenously determined. Russ (2007) is a study of horizontal FDI, where rms relocate to serve consumers in a foreign market, and the focus is on the relationship between the volatility of exchange rate and FDI. Our model however focuses on vertical FDI. We don't impose the market segregation that is necessary to motivate horizontal FDI. Instead, our framework features uctuations in the relative real wage that induce changes in rms' optimal production locations, which is missing from her model.
Our study is also related to a recent and booming literature that analyzes the dynamics of international macroeconomic models with multinational production. Burstein et al. (2008) and Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009) look at how vertical integration of countries aect their business cycle synchronization. Motivated by observations of US multinational activity in Mexico, Bergin et al. (2009 Bergin et al. ( , 2011 argue that vertical FDI increases employment volatility of the recipient country, relative to the source country. Cavallari (2010 Cavallari ( , 2013 incorporate rm entry into an international macro model, and show that the models' predictions better match international business cycle moments in terms of consumption and investment spillovers as well as output comovement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set up the households' and rms' problems and describe the environment of the model in Section 2. We examine the longrun equilibrium of the economy by looking at the non-stochastic steady-state in Section 3.
Section 4 studies the rst order dynamics of the model. We rst solve the model analytically under a specic assumption to gain insights into the model dynamics, and then we solve the model using numerical simulation to further dissect the details in the general case. Section 5 analyzes welfare eects of rm relocation. Section 6 concludes.
Model
There are two countries, North and South, each inhabited by a continuum of households whose total mass is normalized to 1. That is, the world population is 2. In addition, there is a continuum of rms whose total mass is also 2. We assume that half of these rms are owned by Northern households and the other half by Southern households. The only inherent dierence between North and South is the average productivity of rms. Each rm is a monopolistic supplier of a dierentiated good, and the full nature of these rms will be specied later.
Households' problem
A Northern household h tries to maximize a time-separable utility function
The period utility function depends on consumption of a composite good C t (h) and labor supply N t (h):
where the parameters satisfy σ > 0 and φ > 0. The composite good is a Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregate of dierentiated individual consumption goods dened as
, where C t (h, f ) is household h's consumption of the dierentiated good produced by rm f . We assume that the elasticity of substitution µ is greater than 1. Each Northern household h chooses its consumption basket taking the set of individual goods' prices P t (f ) as given.
We follow the approach of Erceg et al. (2000) to incorporate a Calvo type wage-setting mechanism. We assume that households are monopolistic suppliers of labor. Each household supplies a dierentiated type of labor to the rms. Firms produce nal products using the composite labor which is a CES aggregate of dierentiated types of labor dened as
Labor is assumed to be immobile across countries, and thus Northern households supply labor only to rms who produce in the North which include domestically-producing Northern rms, and possibly Southern rms who have relocated to produce in the North as multinationals.
The Northern wage index, dened as the minimum cost of hiring one unit of the composite labor, is given by
where W t (h) is the wage rate set by household h for its dierentiated type of labor. Like any individual rm, each household h has zero weight in the continuum of households, and therefore its particular wage rate has no eect on the aggregate wage. Thus any individual household sets a wage taking the aggregate wage rate as given. Like the monopolistically competitive rm, each household faces a downward-sloping labor demand curve for its particular type of labor given by
where L t is the aggregate employment in period t.
Households engage in Calvo-type wage setting. In each period t, with probability (1 − θ), household h is able to update the wage rate it oers. Otherwise, its wage rate will be ΠW t−1 (h), where Π is the unconditional long-run gross rate of ination of the economy, and W t−1 (h) is the wage rate household h charged last period.
There is an integrated world nancial market where a complete set of state-contingent nominal bonds are traded. These bonds are (arbitrarily) denominated in the Northern currency. Thus, household h faces the recursive period budget constraint P t is the consumer price index. Γ t is the prot earned by Northern rms that is distributed to the household lump-sum, T t is government transfer, and τ w is the rate of government subsidy to labor.
As Ricardian equivalence holds, we assume that the government has a balanced budget every period without loss of generality. Government in this model subsidizes domestic workers and rms at rates τ w and τ p , respectively, in order to oset monopolistic distortion. Thus the total government transfer (or negative of tax) to domestic households equals to negative of the expenditure on labor and rm subsidies:
where Y t (f ) is the output of rm f . We assume that the monetary authority sets nominal interest rate i t according to an ination-targeting rule
whereī is the steady-state nominal interest rate, π t andπ denote the period t and steadystate ination rates respectively, and ν t is the exogenous i.i.d. monetary disturbance. Intra-temporal utility maximization gives us the familiar consumption price index P t , dened as the minimum cost of acquiring one unit of the composite consumption good:
while the demand for an individual product f is given by
where C t is the aggregate Northern consumption. Household h's rst order conditions from the utility-maximization problem include
which, when summed across all states, gives us the Euler equation
In the previous equation, Z t is the price of the riskless nominal portfolio that pays one unit of Northern currency in every state at time t + 1, i.e. the inverse of the gross nominal interest rate. The existence of complete market allows us to drop the household index in consumption, assuming initial symmetry.
We assume that the government chooses the subsidy rate τ w = η to counteract the monopolistic distortion caused by the market power of wage-setters. The rst order condition regarding the optimal wage-setting is then
where V N (h),t+j = (N t+j (h)) φ is the marginal disutility of labor for household h in period t + j, and U c,t+j = C −σ t+j is the marginal utility of consumption. The conditional expectation is taken over states in which the household is unable to update its wage. When a household gets the chance to update its wage in period t, it takes into account the fact that with probability θ every period, the current reset wage will remain eective into the future. Thus it optimally sets a wage by weighing the discounted sum of future marginal disutility of working against the marginal utility of consumption made possible by the extra income from working. As the individual labor demand function (2) makes clear, household h's reset wage at period t depends only on the current and expected future aggregate variables. Thus all wage-resetters in period t must set the same wage rate W t (h) =W t . Given that a constant fraction (1 − θ) of households reset wage in every period, the aggregate wage rate evolves according to
Southern households are symmetric, and Southern variables are denoted by an asterisk over their Northern counterpart.
Firms' problem
Each rm produces a dierentiated product using a technology that is linear in the input of the composite labor. A Northern rm who produces domestically has the production function
where ϕ is the time-invariant, rm-specic productivity, and A t represents the stochastic aggregate productivity of Northern rms. Y t (ϕ) and L t (ϕ) denote the output and labor hired by rm ϕ, respectively. As rms in a given country only dier in terms of their productivity levels, we index Northern rms by their productivities ϕ from now on.
Assume each country gets an aggregate, country-specic productivity shock. The shock aects all rms owned by residents of this country in completely symmetric ways. An increase in A t could capture such technology innovations as the use of internet and/or managerial improvements in a country.
Note that aggregate productivity aects rms headquartered in the country, rather than laborers who reside in the country. In models without rm relocation, these are equivalent.
But when rms are allowed to move across border, it becomes an important distinction. We think in our context, rm-augmenting technology is more realistic and reasonable because, when considering cross-border FDI ow, rms are typically the patent holders. This is also consistent with the literature on welfare gains from multinational production, which emphasizes how MNEs take production technology and managerial know-how to their foreign subsidiaries.
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We abstract from idiosyncratic rm productivity shocks. Our study focuses on macroeconomic outcomes of MNE production. Idiosyncratic shocks change rms' relative positions in the productivity distribution, but as we will show below, the behavior of cross-border FDI ow is determined by the relative aggregate productivity of North and South.
Therefore, when a Northern rm produces as a multinational in the South, its production function is
where the subscript N is a reminder of the origin of the rm. Thus the rm takes its rm-specic technology and the home-country productivity with it to the South. The only component foreign in its production is the employment of Southern workers.
We assume the aggregate productivity follows the process
where t is the exogenous i.i.d. productivity shock.
Firm heterogeneity in productivity is introduced to capture the empirical regularity that multinationals are found to be the more productive rms in their industry. They earn higher revenue, hire more workers, and make larger prot.
4 Following Helpman et al. (2004) and Chaney (2008) , productivities are assumed to be drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter α. Then the Northern rm productivity cumulative distribution function is given by
where ϕ m is the lower bound of the Northern productivity distribution. The shape parameter α is an inverse measure of the heterogeneity of rms. A lower value of α indicates a fatter upper tail of the productivity distribution. We assume that α > µ − 1 to ensure that the (µ−1) th moment of the distribution is bounded. 5 We then normalize the Northern minimum productivity ϕ m to one, but assume that the South has a minimum productivity ϕ * m < 1.
Thus Northern rms have, on average, higher productivity.
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Firms' production location decisions determine cross-border FDI ows. To produce in period t, a rm has to rst decide, in period t − 1, where to produce next period. The rm can choose to produce either in its domestic country or in the foreign country.
7 If it decides to move its production facility overseas, it has to pre-commit a xed real investment cost F in terms of the aggregate consumption good.
8 Producing at home requires no additional cost. We assume that the location decision is irreversible by time t, when production takes place. We also assume the location decision-making is repeated every period, and the xed investment cost has to be paid each time when the rm decides to produce abroad in the following period.
9 The volume of FDI ow in this model is dened as the total xed investment taken by all multinational rms. That is, FDI inow into the South in period t is m t F , where m t is the mass of Northern rms who will produce as MNEs in the South in period t + 1.
Firms are optimally subsidized at the rate τ p =1/ (µ − 1), such that for every unit of nal product the rm sells, the rm receives (1 + τ p )P t (ϕ) . We assume that each country's government subsidizes its own rms, even if the rm is producing abroad.
We abstract from goods market imperfections, and assume that goods are freely traded with no cost. Given this assumption, the law of one price holds for each individual good.
The rm thus receives the same unit price on its sales in both countries, when expressed in 5 This is necessary because otherwise, the total revenue made by MNEs will be unbounded when the cuto productivity goes to innity.
6 An alternative assumption is to assume that the distribution of Northern rms has a dierent shape parameter α than that of Southern rms. All qualitative results we present below only require that Northern rms are more productive on average and do not depend on how the dierence in average productivity is introduced.
7 A rm can, in principle, produce in both countries. However, given the setup of the model, it does not make sense to have more than one production facility. It is always better to produce in the low cost location. a common currency. The rm's total units sold worldwide is denoted Y t (ϕ).
Firms exibly set prices of their outputs. Combined with the production function (9) and demand function (5), the rm's prot maximization problem at time t when producing domestically can be written
where Y w t ≡ C t + C * t + m t F is the total world demand for the composite good. Note that as the xed cost is assumed to be in units of the composite consumption good, period t world demand is increased by the amount m t F when cross-border relocations are present.
10 Since consumption utility functions are identical across countries, purchasing power parity (PPP) holds for the aggregate prices: P t = S t P * t . The nominal exchange rate S t is dened as the Northern currency price of the Southern currency. Therefore a rm's relative prices in the two countries must be equal. This fact enables us to abbreviate the individual demand into (10).
As the result of the optimal subsidy, rms produce the optimal output, at which prices equal to their respective marginal costs. A Northern rm producing at home will optimally set price at
and if it produces in the South instead, the optimal price reects its Southern labor cost and Northern productivity
Now we turn to a typical rm's location choice problem. If a rm decides to produce in the foreign country, it has to pre-commit the xed cost F . When a Northern rm with productivity ϕ produces domestically, it earns the prot
and if producing in the South, it earns the prot
expressed in Northern currency. The rm will choose to produce as a multinational if and only if the expected discounted gain from moving abroad is large enough to compensate for the current xed cost F , i.e.
is the stochastic discount factor. When we substitute the prot functions (13) and (14) into the expression above, use the optimal prices (11) and (12), and rearrange, we can reduce the inequality to
where ω t ≡ W t /P t denotes the Northern real wage and ω * t ≡ W * t /P * t denotes the Southern real wage. Inequality (15) outlines the break-even condition for Northern rm ϕ. The lefthand-side is the real expected discounted gain from switching production abroad, and the right-hand-side is the real cost.
The break-even condition (15) suggests three points. First, a lower real wage in the South, and therefore a lower marginal cost of production, is the source of potential gain for a Northern rm to become multinational. On the other hand, if Southern real wage is lower, no Southern rm will nd it protable to move to produce in the North. Thus there can only be one-way FDI ow in the model. Second, the scope of the gain is a monotonically increasing function of the rm's productivity level, implying that there exists a cuto productivityφ t such that in period t, a Northern rm with productivity ϕ =φ t will just break even in expectation by switching its production location to the South in period t + 1, and every Northern rm with productivity level ϕ >φ t must expect to make a positive net discounted prot by relocating and thus must decide to produce as a multinational in the next period.
Finally, a higher expected aggregate productivity in the North makes Northern rms more likely to be a multinational, as it enhances the marginal gain from accessing lower cost labor in the same manner as the rm-specic productivity.
Southern rms have symmetric production functions and face the same choices. The only asymmetry between North and South is the average productivity levels of rms.
Aggregation
In this section, we aggregate across rms, so that each economy can be described as having a representative rm whose productivity depends on the MNE distribution. We write down the equations for the case when some Northern rms are producing in the South as multinationals. The case of Southern FDI ow into the North is symmetric to the current analysis.
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Northern rms with productivity ϕ <φ t−1 produce in the domestic country in period t. Using the production function (9), the demand for individual goods (5), and the optimal price-setting (11), we can write the aggregate labor demand as a function that depends only on aggregate variables and a measure of aggregate productivity in the North:
is a measure of the aggregate productivity of rms who produce in the North. Likewise, the labor demand in the South is given by
is the aggregate productivity of Northern rms who produce in the South in period t, i.e., the multinationals, andφ * ≡
is the mean productivity of Southern rms.
Meanwhile, the total prot earned by Northern rms, denoted by Γ t , includes prots of Northern rms who produce domestically, and Northern rms who produce in the South (in case multinational rms are present). These prots are reduced by the amount of the xed 11 We show later that given the assumption that Northern rms have higher average productivity, FDI ow from North to South is the relevant case to examine. investment cost
Using the optimal price-setting rule (11), for a Northern rm ϕ who produces domestically, its prot is
Integrating over domestically-producing Northern rms using a similar procedure as in (16), we nd that the total prot made by these rms is given by, in real terms,
Likewise, the total real prot made by the set of Northern MNEs is
In the next section, we will use these aggregate prots to derive steady-state consumption.
3 Steady-State FDI
We will proceed by linearizing the model around a non-stochastic steady state, assuming zero initial wealth. The steady state describes the long-run equilibrium toward which the economy moves absent shocks. In the steady state, all real variables are constant and all nominal variables grow at the constant rateπ. We denote the value of a variable at steady state by an overbar, except for the aggregate productivities (17) and (19), whose steady-state values are simply denoted by the variables without the time subscript.
As there can't be two-way FDI ows, the direction of FDI ow in the steady-state could fall in one of three cases: Northern rms relocate to produce in the South, Southern rms relocate to produce in the North, or there could be no FDI ow. We write down the relevant equations for the rst case here. The reversed case is symmetric, and the zero FDI case is a special case of the former two. We prove that given the assumption of higher productivity in the North, in the steady state, FDI ows from North to South.
In the non-stochastic steady-state, every Northern household sets the same wage rate and supply the same amount of labor, implyingL =N (h) andW =W (h) across house-holds. The wage distribution degenerates into a single value. The optimal wage-setting rule (7) reduces to the simple and familiar labor supply rule that equates the marginal rate of substitution to the real wageω
Dividing the Northern labor supply by its Southern counterpart, we get
Incorporating steady-state versions of the aggregate labor demands (16) and (18) into (24), the labor market equilibrium in the steady-state thus requires
whereφ N andφ * N are the steady-state values of the aggregate productivities dened in (17) and (19).
The budget constraint states that in the steady-state, each country's consumption is the sum of its residents' labor income and the net prots earned by domestic rms, minus the government subsidy to rms. Thus for the North,
AndΓ t , the prots made by Northern rms, is the sum of prots made by domestic producers and that made by multinationals. Taking the steady-state value of (16), (20), and (21) and substituting into the above expression, we nd that the steady-state consumption is given
Similarly, the Southern consumption is given bȳ
We prove that in the steady-state, there are positive FDI ows and its direction depends on the average productivities of the countries.
Proposition. When two countries have dierent average productivities and are otherwise identical, in the steady-state, multinational rms originating from the high-productivity country relocate to produce in the low-productivity country.
Proof. See appendix.
As our focus is economic uctuations over business cycles of normal magnitude, in later approximations around the steady-state, we assume that the shocks are never big enough to reverse the direction of FDI ow.
FDI and Exchange Rate over the Business Cycle
In this section, we examine the dynamics of the model in a rst order approximation. In the rst subsection, we analytically solve the rst-order dynamics of rms' location decisions under a special assumption to gain insights into the model. In the second subsection, we present results from a numerical analysis of the general model.
First order dynamics at zero xed cost
An analytically tractable solution to the cross-country distribution of rms is possible when we approximate the model around a steady-state where the xed investment cost is zero. As we will see, despite being a special case, the analytical study in this section unveils the basic mechanism behind the rst-order dynamics of the location distribution of rms.
As PPP holds for prices of consumption baskets in this model, we take the relative labor cost ω t /ω * t as the relevant real exchange rate. We rst show how are the relative real wage and FDI ows are related. We also look at how nominal exchange rate and FDI ows are related.
Following Melitz (2003) and subsequent literature, we take the xed cost F as the embodiment of barrier to cross-border FDI ows. When F goes to innity, it becomes excessively expensive to relocate overseas and cross-border direct investment shuts down, leaving the economy in a domestic production equilibrium. When F shrinks to zero, the economy has no barrier to FDI ows.
As the break-even condition makes clear, the xed cost also serves as a lter that selects the most productive rms into oversea production. When a nite xed cost exists, a rm has to be productive enough to earn an expected excess prot at least as large as the xed cost to move to a location overseas. Thus the set of multinational rms come from the upper truncation of the productivity distribution. When there is no xed cost at all, we don't exactly know who among the Northern rms become multinationals. But here we consider the special case F = 0 to be the limit of the series of equilibria when F shrinks toward zero.
Thus we impose the requirement that the most productive rms are the rst to become MNEs.
Denote the log deviation from steady-state of a variable x byx ≡ log (x/x). The Euler equation can be linearized toẐ t = σĈ t +P t − σE tĈt+1 − E tPt+1 .
(28)
As is well known, the combination of complete market and PPP implies that consumption ratio C t /C * t is constant at the initial level. Subtracting the linearized Southern Euler equation from its Northern counterpart, and usingĈ t =Ĉ * t and PPP, we get the uncovered interest parity condition
Following Galí (2008), we dene the nominal interest rate as i t ≡ − log Z t . Using the interest rate rule (4), we solve the exchange rate depreciation as a function of the monetary shocks
where ∆x t ≡ x t − x t−1 denotes the change of variable x from period t − 1 to t. The nominal exchange rate follows a random walk, and a relative Northern monetary tightening causes a Northern appreciation.
Using the optimal wage-setting rule (7), together with the individual labor demand (2) and aggregate wage evolution (8), we get an equation governing the evolution of the aggregate real wage 12
where MRS t ≡ φL t + σĈ t is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure, and
captures the responsiveness of the aggregate wage to the current period deviation of MRS from the real wage. Subtracting the Southern counterpart of the wage-setting equation (30) 12 The derivation follows closely that of Erceg et al. (2000) . See the appendix of that paper for the procedure.
from the Northern one, and rearranging, we get
wherex d t ≡x t −x * t denotes the North-South dierence in variable x.
From linearizing the aggregate labor demand equations (16) and (18) 
Given the assumption that the productivity distributions are Pareto, the aggregate productivities (17) and (19) can be expressed as functions of the cuto productivityφ t−1 . We can write the relative labor demand as a function of the real wage gap, cuto productivity, and relative aggregate productivitŷ
where z = κφαφ
The relative labor demand depends positively on the cuto productivity. A higherφ t−1 means less Northern rms are producing as MNEs in the South, increasing the labor demand in the North relative to South.
When the xed cost is set to zero, the break-even condition (15) can be linearized to a simple relation
This states that when there's no barrier to FDI investment, rms will relocate until the real wage rates in the two countries are equalized in expectation.
PPP implies that the dierence in ination rates must be reected in the nominal ex-change rate depreciation
We can use the solution to the nominal exchange rate depreciation (29) (31) , we obtain an expression of the real exchange ratê
where
∈ (0, 1) ,
These coecients are all positive. The equilibrium relative real wage depends positively on the lagged cuto productivity, because higher cuto productivity means more Northern rms are producing at home, increasing the relative labor demand in the North. The sluggish wage adjustment means the relative real wage also depends positively on its own lagged value and the monetary shocks. A relative monetary tightening in the North causes real wage rate in the North to rise relative to the South. Finally, a Northern productivity gain causes the real wage to rise in the North through increased labor demand.
We substitute (34) into the linearized break-even condition (33) to get a solution to the cuto productivitŷ
The fraction of Northern rms who will be producing as multinationals in period t + 1 is 1 − G (φ t ). Thus the cuto productivity is negatively related to the size of FDI. The solutions to the relative real wage and the cuto productivity have made it clear that the real exchange rate, as measured by the relative real wage, and the FDI inow in a given period are positively correlated, under either nominal shocks or productivity shocks.
The break-even condition for the marginal multinational rm is the key to understand this correlation. Essentially, the break-even condition states that rm relocation will continue until the expected North-South real wage gap shrinks to a level at which the marginal rm cannot expect to make a prot anymore. (In the special case F = 0, the real wages have to equalize in expectation.) The correlation in the case of nominal shocks is relatively straightforward. A relative Northern monetary tightening increases the relative Northern real wage, as under the sluggish wage-setting, the nominal wages are not responsive enough to oset the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Also as a consequence of the sticky wage, the relative real wage is history-dependent. Thus the current wage gap is expected to persist into the next period. This induces more Northern rms to commit to producing abroad in the next period, causing an increased FDI ow into the South.
A relative Northern productivity gain drives up the relative real wage, as the average rm producing in the North is more productive. Firm relocation increases for two reasons. First, productivity processes are persistent. The higher Northern productivity today is expected to be inherited next period. Thus the real wage gap is expected to continue existing, causing more rms to relocate. Second, the sticky wage-setting still implies that the current wage gap is going to continue into the next period, again causing more MNE relocation. The relocation caused by the persistence of productivity will happen with or without sticky wage, and is captured in equation (35) While the nominal exchange rate is clearly positively correlated with FDI inow overall, it should be noted that the unresponsiveness of the nominal exchange rate to productivity shocks is specic to the model assumptions. For example, if we allow monetary policy to follow a general Taylor rule, so that it targets the output gap in addition to ination, nominal exchange rate would appreciate in response to a positive productivity shock, enhancing the positive correlation between the nominal exchange rate and FDI inows.
Numerical simulation
In this subsection, we numerically simulate the model for the general case when the xed cost is positive, and highlight several key features.
The parameterization mainly follows Erceg et al. (2000) . We set a (quarterly) discount rate β = 0.99, and utility parameters σ = φ = 1.5. We choose an elasticity of substitution µ = 4, and wage mark-up rate η = 1/3. The probability of wage stickiness is set to θ = 0.75.
This corresponds to an average wage contract duration of one year. Following Russ (2007) , we set α = µ + 0.1 to make the dispersion of rm productivity close to one, as the cross-industry estimation by Helpman et al. (2004) suggests.
13 The Southern minimum productivity is set to 1/2. Next, we set the xed cost to 0.01. In the steady-state, about 7% Northern rms produce as multinationals. Regarding the interest rate rule, the ination response coecient is set to ρ = 1.5. The persistence coecient of the aggregate productivity is set to ζ = 0.9. Finally, the monetary and productivity shocks have a standard deviation of 0.02. wage period-by-period. Specically, in the second period after the shock, the relocation of MNEs to the South puts so much upward pressure on the labor demand in the South, that it drives the relative real wage down to a level slightly below the steady-state. This happens because the productivity gain by Northern rms is large enough, so that relocation is protable even if the real wage gap is smaller. When the relative real wage recovers again in the following period, so does the mass of MNEs.
13 Helpman et al. (2004) estimated productivity dispersion, measured by the value of the coecient α − (µ − 1), using industry level data for U.S. and European rms. The estimations of these industry-specic dispersion parameters range from 0.52 to 2.97. The qualitative simulation results in this section are robust to these alternative dispersion parameters. See Helpman et al. (2003) , Table A.1. 14 We try dierent parameter values to make sure the qualitative results are robust to alternative parameterizations. Changes in relative production costs -the relative real wage -is a main driver of MNE relocations in this model. Given its importance, it is worthwhile to examine the empirical tness of the cyclical behavior of real wage. The model predicts that the aggregate real wage is pro-cyclical under productivity shocks, and counter-cyclical under monetary shocks. In the benchmark simulation, the aggregate real wage of each country is moderately positively correlated with its output. But what the model really predicts is that if an economy is hit by both productivity and monetary shocks, the aggregate real wage could either be procyclical or countercyclical, depending on the relative volatility of the shocks. This is consistent with the empirical evidence on the acyclicality of aggregate real wage in the US (Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) ). It is also consistent with the cross-country heterogeneity in real wage cyclicality at the aggregate level (Messina et al. (2009) ).
Recent advances in empirical labor economics were largely guided by the search and matching model. New empirical works typically use matched micro-level data, which allows a careful examination of subgroups of the labor force. A consensus is that the wage rate of new matches is procyclical (Pissarides (2009) ). This is also consistent with the model The prediction of the model seems to be consistent with the view that a country can attract more FDI inow by engineering a depreciation, but it also predicts that the outcome is undesirable from the depreciating country's point of view.
Going back to Figure 1 , where the economy experiences an unexpected Southern monetary expansion, the Southern real wage drops. The more productive Northern rms are attracted by the lower real wage abroad after the shock, and their relocation means the demand for Southern labor is further increased. Note that without these new MNEs, Southern (Northern) workers would already be working too much (too little) compared to the exible-price long-run equilibrium level, as the Southern monetary expansion lowers (raises) the Southern (Northern) real wage. The entry of new MNEs thus drives the aggregate employments in both countries further away from their long-run equilibrium level. Figure 3 shows the IRFs of outputs and period utilities after the Southern monetary expansion. Southern output increases sharply as Southern employment expands. Northern output drops. The welfare eects of these cross-border relocations after a monetary shock is asymmetric across the two countries. As the Southern real wage depreciation attracts more FDI inow, households are worse o as they end up working more, while households in the North enjoy more leisure. Thus the model suggests that an unanticipated depreciation attracts more FDI inow, but leaves the domestic agents worse o as they work more under sticky wage contracts. It is not benecial to the domestic household to manipulate the exchange rate to attract FDI inow. Rather, the reversed operation of an articial appreciation that drives rms abroad is welfare-improving. Of course, the gain is only to the appreciating country, the world as a whole loses utility from such deviations caused by nominal rigidity. The fact that rm relocation exacerbates employment deviations under nominal shocks is consistent with the empirical nding of Bergin et al. (2009). 15 In Figure 3 we examine how period utility changes after the shock. The interesting question is, if relocation of MNEs exacerbate the business cycle uctuations around the ecient steady-state level, what are the 15 Bergin et al. (2009) emphasize that the Mexican maquiladora industry has higher employment volatility than its US counterpart. In our model though, we stress that the eect is bilateral. Of course, if the model is revised so that the South is much smaller than the North, we would expect to see the same rm relocations to create a larger impact on the South. Under nominal shocks, the marginal MNE relocation decreases welfare by magnifying business cycle uctuations. Under real shocks, it has an ambiguous welfare eect. In terms of magnitude, we show that the welfare impact of FDI under nominal shocks is much larger than that under real shocks. We conclude that in an environment with mixed nominal and real shocks, the model that allows only long-term rm relocation produces the highest level of welfare.
Welfare implication of rm relocation under monetary shocks
In this subsection, we shut down real shocks, and examine the welfare eects of FDI under nominal shocks only. The world welfare is dened as the unconditional expectation of the unweighted sum of Northern and Southern household average period utilities, that is, However, while welfare under both the FDI and domestic production scenarios decrease with the volatility of monetary shocks, the rate of decrease is higher with FDI ows. An inspection of terms that aect welfare show that FDI's impact on aggregate employment is the culprit. When the volatility of monetary shocks gets higher, on average, the relative real wage is driven further away from its exible-price equilibrium level. This then induces more temporary relocation of rms, causing aggregate employments to deviate even more, as we have shown in the last section. Thus the option to relocate in the short run amplies the ineciency caused by the nominal rigidity in wage-setting. As a result, if monetary volatility is suciently high, it becomes welfare-improving to shut down cross-border FDI ows altogether. In our baseline calibration, the utility with FDI drops below the utility under domestic production at a standard deviation of 4.3%.
These welfare results under nominal shocks can be thought of as an application of the theory of second best. When a friction causes a market failure, allowing market participants to freely exploit the opportunities caused by the friction could magnify the overall welfare loss. In our specic case, the same FDI ow induced by a lower production cost abroad could be benecial or harmful depending on the underlying cause of that lower real wage in the rst place. It is welfare-improving when the real wage gap is caused by the fundamental dierence in productivity, but exacerbates the welfare loss when the wage gap is caused by nominal frictions.
Therefore, there should be no surprise that the best outcome occurs under the scenario that only keeps the MNE relocations of the long-run nature. The top dotted red curve with circular markers in Figure 4 depicts the world welfare when we simply keep the steady-state distribution of rms, but disallow further moving back-and-forth. World utility is highest under this scenario at every monetary volatility level, as the economy is able to reap the gain from long-run rm relocation, but avoid the harm caused by short-run relocations aimed to take advantage of nominal rigidities.
Welfare implication of rm relocation under productivity shocks
This subsection looks at the welfare eects of FDI in an environment with productivity shocks. We again compare world welfare under the benchmark model, the domestic production model, and the ssMNE model. Figure 5 depicts the welfare in the three models when the standard deviation of productivity shocks increases from zero to 0.1. The solid blue curve is welfare under the benchmark model, the dotted green curve is welfare under the domestic production model, and the thin red curve with circular markers is the welfare under the ssMNE model.
Clearly, both the benchmark and ssMNE models dominate the domestic production model. In the relevant range of productivity shock volatility, the loss from the absence of FDI mainly comes from the failure to capture the long-run gain of FDI. A more careful examination indicates that the proximity of the welfare under the two models is a result of counteracting forces. The marginal MNE relocation benets the economy in two ways. It increases mean consumption in both countries, as the relocation motivated by productivity changes allows MNEs to reduce production cost. MNE relocations also serve as an employment risk-sharing mechanism between the two countries. Consider a positive productivity shock in the North. Absent rm relocations, the Northern productivity gain makes domestic workers work harder. Meanwhile, Southern consumers enjoy more leisure because Southern consumption increases under a complete asset market, driving down the marginal utility gain of working. Relocations of MNEs redistribute labor eorts in an equalizing way. With the Northern productivity gain, more Northern rms nd it protable to move abroad, increasing labor demand in the South, while reducing it in the North. As the utility function is concave in leisure, this redistribution improves world welfare, in the same way as the redistribution of consumptions by complete markets. Figure 6 in the appendix illustrates this redistribution eect.
With these benets, why wouldn't the marginal MNE relocations be welfare-improving?
The answer lies in nominal rigidity. With sticky wages, MNE distribution deviates from the ecient exible-wage equilibrium. When a positive productivity shock hits the North, for example, Northern rms over-relocate upon impact.
16 We have analytically shown this mechanism in Section 4.1, after deriving the cuto productivity (35). The over-relocation drives labor eorts away from the ecient level and causes a loss of welfare.
The resulting welfare implication then reects a tradeo between the gain from consumption increase and labor eort sharing, and the loss from the distortion. The gain is available under exible or sticky wages, but the loss is only a consequence of nominal rigidity. This suggests that the net welfare gain from the relocation of marginal MNEs increases with the degree of nominal wage exibility. Indeed, when we compute world welfare under exible wages, which can be considered as the limiting case of the benchmark model when the probability of resetting wage goes to one, the benchmark model yields higher utility at every level of real shock volatility.
However, note that under productivity shocks, the dierence in the magnitudes of welfare produced by the benchmark model and the ssMNE model is extremely small. Even when wage is completely exible, so that the loss from nominal distortions is eliminated, and the standard deviation of the productivity shocks reaches 0.1, the gain in world welfare from having marginal MNE relocations is still so small that agents in the model are only willing to give up 0.14% of steady-state consumption to go from the ssMNE model to the benchmark model. In contrast, in the benchmark calibration, when the standard deviation of nominal shocks is 0.02, agents are willing to give up 3.24% of steady-state consumption to shut down the marginal relocations.
The dierence in the magnitude of the welfare implications thus suggests that, at business cycle frequency, the welfare eect of short-run FDI ows mainly comes from its magnication of uctuations caused by nominal shocks. In an environment when the source of economic uctuations is unobservable, the ssMNE model in which the marginal MNE relocation is disabled produces the highest welfare level for any reasonable mixture of monetary and productivity shocks. macro model. We analyze rms' cross-border production location decisions in a model in which both the exchange rate and FDI ow are endogenously determined. The paper shows that FDI ow and exchange rate are positively correlated under monetary or productivity shocks. Welfare analysis shows that short-run FDI uctuations exacerbate utility loss in an environment with nominal shocks, but has little impact on welfare over business cycles caused by productivity shocks. Thus the best outcome can be achieved if long-term FDI is retained, but short-run movement in the production location is disallowed.
An interesting question is then, how can a policy be implemented to discourage the shortrun rm relocations when the steady-state distribution is unknown, or when rm productivity is not directly observable? One possibility is to require a minimum operation time. For example, a country could disallow sale of principal capital for several years. A country might also impose a capital tax to discourage the temporary relocations. In either case, the key is to make entry protable for the long-term investors, but deter the short-term prot seekers. Designing such a policy would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Appendix

FDI Flows
Proposition. When two countries have dierent average productivities and are otherwise identical, in the steady-state, multinational rms originating from the high-productivity country relocate to produce in the low-productivity country. is the average productivity of Northern rms. By assumption,φ >φ * , and therefore (36) impliesC /C * < 1. On the other hand, without foreign production, each country gets to consume its domestic output. Setφ * µ−1 H = 0,φ H =φ and G(φ) = 1 in the two budget constraints (26) and (27), and then divide to get C C * =φ µ−1 ϕ * µ−1 > 1, which leads to a contradiction with the prediction from the labor market equilibrium condition.
Case 2: Assume that in steady-state, FDI ows from South to North.
If this is true, the breakeven condition (15) implies that the real wage must be higher in the South, i.e.ω * >ω. We have the counterpart of (25), which can be written as 
F.
The labor market equilibrium states thatC /C * < 1, and the last term is a non-negative number. Therefore we must havē 
as the North has higher average productivity. But the previous inequality (38) also implies thatω * <ω, which leads to a contradiction, as the break-even condition states that when there is positive FDI ow from South to North, Southern real wage must be higher than the Northern real wage. Therefore Case 2 cannot be true. The only possible equilibrium is for multinational rms to relocate from the country with high productivity to the country with low productivity.
7.2 Welfare under productivity shocks 
